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JUDICIAL LIMITATION OF THE
EMPLOYMENT AT-WILL DOCTRINE
INTRODUCTION
In February 1973, Marily Jo Kelsay was injured in the course
of her employment.' After filing an application for compensation
pursuant to the state's worker's compensation act, Kelsay received
a settlement award in the amount of $745.50.2 When later dis-
missed from her job, she alleged it was in retaliation for the filing
of her worker's compensation claim.3 Kelsay consequently com-
menced an action for wrongful discharge against her employer in
state court.
4
In October 1975 Daniel E. Leach filed a worker's compensa-
tion claim against his employer.' Two weeks later Leach was dis-
charged and, like Ms. Kelsay, instituted an action alleging that his
employer had terminated his employment solely because he had
filed a worker's compensation claim.6
Both cases came before the Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth
District, in August 1977. In each, the primary issue was whether
the plaintiff had stated a cause of action by alleging that he was
discharged solely because he had filed a worker's compensation
claim.7 In Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc.,8 a panel of the appellate court
decided that the plaintiff had failed to state a cause of action.,
Emphasizing that the plaintiff did not have an employment con-
tract with the defendant for a specific term and was therefore em-
' Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 51 Ill. App. 3d 1016, 1016, 366 N.E.2d 1141, 1142 (1977),
rev'd, 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978).
2 51 Ill. App. 3d at 1017, 366 N.E.2d at 1142. In addition to the flat monetary payment,
the settlement required the employer to pay for the plaintiff's medical expenses. Id.
3 Id. at 1016, 366 N.E.2d at 1142.
' Id. The complaint was framed solely in tort and alleged that the defendant, whose
conduct was described as willful and wanton, wrongfully discharged the plaintiff for filing
the compensation claim. Id.
Leach v. Lauhoff Grain Co., 51 Ill. App. 3d 1022, 366 N.E.2d 1145 (1977).
6 Id. at 1023, 366 N.E.2d at 1146.
51 Ill. App. 3d at 1022, 366 N.E.2d at 1146; 51 Ill. App. 3d at 1017, 366 N.E.2d at
1142.
8 51 Ill. App. 3d 1016, 366 N.E.2d 1141 (1977), rev'd, 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353
(1978).
' Id. at 1020-21, 366 N.E.2d at 1144-45.
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ployed "at will," the court held that Kelsay's employment was ter-
minable by either party "with or without cause and with no right
of action for discharge."10 In contrast, the panel that decided
Leach v. Lauhoff Grain Co.1 held that the plaintiff was entitled to
relief.12 Notwithstanding its acknowledgment of the rule that an
at-will employee ordinarily may be terminated for any or no
cause," the Leach court declared that the state's policy of compen-
sating injured workers overrode the employer's right to discharge
where "the firing [was] for the ulterior purpose of evading liability
under the [worker's compensation law]."' 4
The purpose of this Note is to examine the at-will doctrine,
which states that an employment contract for an indefinite term is
terminable at the will of either the employer or the employee.15
-0 Id. at 1017, 366 N.E.2d at 1142. Although the plaintiff cited several cases wherein the
courts had relied on public policy considerations to limit the at-will employer's right to
discharge, id. at 1019-20, 366 N.E.2d at 1143-44, the Kelsay court maintained that the Illi-
nois legislature had intended to implement the public policy of its worker's compensation
laws only through the imposition of criminal penalties. Id. at 1020, 366 N.E.2d at 1144; see
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.26 (Smith-Hurd 1969 & Supp. 1979). Thus, the court concluded
that it would constitute impermissible "judicial legislation" to imply that the statute au-
thorized a cause of action in tort as an additional enforcement mechanism. Id. at 1020, 366
N.E.2d at 1144 (citing Loucks v. Star City Glass Co., 551 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1977)).
Presiding Justice Craven filed a strong dissent. Characterizing the discharge of Kelsay
as an "outrageous" violation of public policy, the dissent disputed the majority's immuniza-
tion of the defendant's conduct from common-law liability. 51 Ill. App. 3d at 1021, 366
N.E.2d at 1145 (Craven, P.J., dissenting). Justice Craven reasoned that if the employer re-
tains complete freedom to fire an employee in retaliation for filing a worker's compensation
claim, most injured employees will be reluctant to pursue their claims for compensation.
Thus, the holding of the majority granted the employer the "best of both worlds": no com-
mon-law liability and little likelihood of a claim being filed under worker's compensation.
Id. at 1021, 366 N.E.2d at 1145 (Craven, P.J., dissenting).
It should be noted that Kelsay appealed, and the Illinois Supreme Court reversed, em-
ploying a rationale similar to that of Presiding Justice Craven. 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353
(1978).
" 51 Ill. App. 3d 1022, 366 N.E.2d 1145 (1977).
12 Id. at 1022-23, 366 N.E.2d at 1146.
Id. at 1024, 366 N.E.2d at 1147.
I Id. at 1026, 366 N.E.2d at 1148. Presiding Justice Craven, author of the Leach opin-
ion, used much of the logic employed in his Kelsay dissent. Id.; see note 10 supra. The court
found a strong public policy in favor of providing financial and medical benefits to the vic-
tims of work-related injuries. 51 Ill. App. 3d at 1026, 366 N.E.2d at 1148. Thus, it refused to
allow an at-will employer to thwart this policy by using his power of termination. Id.
"' Under the traditional common law, when a contract for employment expressly quali-
fied the terms of employment, the courts enforced the wishes of the parties. E.g., Egbert v.
Sun Co., 126 F. 568 (E.D. Pa. 1903); see Johns v. Graham & Morton Transp. Co., 51 Mich.
539, 16 N.W. 893 (1883). In cases where no term was specified, however, the "American"
rule has been that a contract setting forth an employee's compensation in terms of weekly,
monthly, annual or other periods, but otherwise silent as to duration, was considered a con-
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After a discussion of the historical development of the doctrine,16
recent legislative efforts and cases that have created exceptions to
the at-will rule will be analyzed. 17 Finally, the Note will articulate
a standard in an attempt to lend some semblance of uniformity to
the inconsistent case law. Theories of recovery will be analyzed,
and the burden of proof necessary to satisfy the proposed standard
under each theory also will be discussed. I"
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Development of the At-Will Doctrine
During the nineteenth century, laissez-faire 9 was the predom-
inant economic theory in this country.20 Writers of the period in-
tract for an indefinite period. E.g., Thoma v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 352 F. Supp. 580,
584-85 (W.D. Pa. 1972); Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 176 F. Supp. 45, 47-48 (S.D.N.Y.
1959), rev'd on other grounds, 277 F.2d 46 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 824 (1960); Jus-
tice v. Stanley Aviation Corp., 35 Colo. App. 1, 4, 530 P.2d 984, 985 (1974); Thomas v.
Ballou-Latimer Drug Co., 92 Idaho 337, 341, 442 P.2d 747, 751 (1968); Cartwright v. Golub
Corp., 51 App. Div. 2d 407, 409, 381 N.Y.S.2d 901, 902 (3d Dep't 1976); Gillian v. Consoli-
dated Foods Corp., 424 Pa. 407, 414, 227 A.2d 858, 862 (1967); Wright v. Standard Ul-
tramarine & Color Co., 141 W.Va. 368, 383, 90 S.E.2d 459, 467 (1955); J. CALAMARI & J.
PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 23, at 32 (1970); A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 70, at 292-93 (1963); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 442, Comment b at 339 (1958).
Similarly, characterizing the employment as "permanent" was insufficient to take it out
of the at-will category. E.g., Milligan v. Union Corp., 87 Mich. App. 179, 182, 274 N.W.2d
10, 12 (1978); Burkhimer v. Gealy, 39 N.C. App. 450, 454, 250 S.E.2d 678, 682 (1979); Forrer
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 36 Wis. 2d 388, 392-93, 153 N.W.2d 587, 589 (1967); J. CALAMARI &
J. PERILLO, supra, § 23, at 32.
"0 See notes 19-42 and accompanying text infra.
17 See notes 43-105 and accompanying text infra.
18 See notes 106-152 and accompanying text infra.
"' Laissez-faire, a theory which opposes governmental "interference" with economic af-
fairs, has been characterized as follows:
Society, having for its object the prevention of individuals from injuring each
other, has no control over industry until it becomes harmful. The nature of indus-
try is to struggle against a rival industry, by a perfectly free competition, with
efforts to obtain an intrinsic superiority. . . . Of the rights, that society certainly
possesses, it results that it does not possess a right to employ against the industry
of one, in favor of another, the power and the means that were given it for the
benefit of all.
B. Twiss, LAWYERS AND THE CONSTITUTION 45-46 (1942) (quoting brief for plaintiff upon
Reargument at 46 (Appendix), Butcher's Benevolent Ass'n v. Cresent City Live-Stock Land-
ing & Slaughter House Co., 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872)).
20 See B. Twiss, supra note 19, at 44-62. See generally E. BOGART, ECONOMIC HISTORY
OF THE UNITED STATES (1912); Y. BRENNER, A SHORT HISTORY OF ECONOMIC PROGRESS
(1969); J. GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM (1956); R. GRAY & J. PETERSON, ECONOMIC DE-
VELOPMENT OF THE UNITED STATES (1912); Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Free-
dom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 1404, 1416-
EMPLOYMENT AT- WILL
sisted on freedom of bargaining as a "fundamental and indispensa-
ble requisite of progress."'" It was asserted that only by free
bargaining could the employer reach an agreement with the em-
ployee that was satisfactory to both.22 The at-will doctrine is a
product of this era.23 Rather than evolving from judicial decisions
or legislative mandate, the rule apparently originated in a treatise
on the law of master and servant.24 Nevertheless, the majority of
American jurisdictions adopted the doctrine as a matter of
course.25 The legal underpinning of the rule was primarily the con-
tractual principle of mutuality of obligation.26 The principle pre-
sumed, as do most contractual principles, equality of bargaining
power between the parties to the agreement. Thus, since it was
never assumed that an employee was employed permanently or for
a fixed period and therefore was free to terminate the employment
19 (1967).
21 Williston, Freedom of Contract, 6 CORNELL L.Q. 365, 366 (1921).
22 A necessary assumption was that the employer and employee had comparable bar-
gaining power. While this may have been true at one time, see Y. BRENNER, supra note 20,
at 210, it is apparent that this is no longer the case, see notes 32-42 and accompanying text
infra. See generally A. JAY, MANAGEMENT AND MACHIAVELLI (1967).
23 See Note, A Remedy for the Discharge of Professional Employees Who Refuse to
Perform Unethical or Illegal Acts: A Proposal in Aid of Professional Ethics, 28 VAND. L.
REV. 805, 823 (1975). See generally Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will
Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HisT. 118 (1976); Note, A Common Law Action for the Abusively
Discharged Employee, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1435 (1975).
24 H. WOOD, MASTER AND SERVANT § 134 (1877). In this work, the author proclaimed:
With us the rule is inflexible that a general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a
hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring, the burden is
upon him to establish it by proof. A hiring at so much a day, week, month, or
year, no time being specified, is an indefinite hiring, and no presumption attaches
that it was for a day even, but only at the rate fixed for whatever time the party
may serve.
Id. As support for his conclusion Wood merely cited four cases: Wilder v. United States, 5
Ct. CL. 462 (1869), rev'd on other grounds, 80 U.S (13 Wall.) 254 (1871); De Briar v. Min-
turn, 1 Cal. 450 (1851); Tatterson v. Suffolk Mfg. Co., 106 Mass. 56 (1870); Franklin Mining
Co. v. Harris, 24 Mich. 115 (1871). Ironically, none of these cases supported him. Note,
Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335, 341 & n.54 (1974).
21 See, e.g., Haney v. Caldwell, 35 Ark. 156 (1879); Greer.v. Arlington Mills Mfg. Co., 17
Del. 581, 43 A. 609 (1899); Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 148 N.Y. 117, 42 N.E. 416
(1895). See generally Blades, supra note 20; Summers, Individual Protection Against Un-
just Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481 (1976); Note, Employment Contracts
of Unspecified Duration, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 107 (1942); Note, Implied Contract Rights to
Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335, 340-47 (1974).
26 The concept of mutuality of obligation provides that unless both parties to a contract
are bound, neither is bound. J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 15, § 67; see 1 S. WILLIS-
TON, CONTRACTS § 105A (3d ed. 1957). The doctrine of mutuality of obligation, however, has
been disfavored in recent years. See note 39 infra.
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relationship at any time, it was reasoned that the employer must
also have the right to dismiss the employee for any or no reason.
The rather harsh effects of this rule, however, soon became
apparent. In one case,28 for example, an at-will employee alleged
that he had been discharged solely because his immediate superior
had been unsuccessful in an attempt to alienate the affections of
the plaintiff's wife.29 In dismissing the action, the court held that
the plaintiff's discharge was legal "regardless of the motive or mal-
ice which actuated it.""0 This holding was typical of the approach
taken by many courts that the at-will employee could be termi-
nated "for good cause, for no cause, or even cause morally wrong,
without being thereby guilty of legal wrong." 31
27 Pitcher v. United Oil & Gas Syndicate, Inc., 174 La. 66, 139 So. 760 (1932). The
Pitcher court explained why an employment for an indefinite term was terminable at will as
follows:
The reason . . . is obvious. An employee is never presumed to engage his ser-
vices permanently, thereby cutting himself off from all chances of improving his
condition; indeed, in this land of opportunity it would be against public policy and
the spirit of our institutions that any man should thus handicap himself ....
And if the contract of employment be not binding on the employee . . . then it
cannot be binding upon the employer; there would be lack of "mutuality."
Id. at 67, 139 So. at 761.
28 Comerford v. International Harvester Co., 235 Ala. 376, 178 So. 894 (1938).
29 Id. at 377, 178 So. at 895.
30 Id. at 378, 178 So. at 896.
31 Payne v. Western & Atl. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884), overruled on other
grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 134 (1915); accord Percival v. General
Motors Corp., 539 F.2d 1126 (8th Cir. 1976) (employee dismissed after 26 years service alleg-
edly because he refused to give false information to the government); Pearson v. Youngs-
town Sheet & Tube Co., 332 F.2d 439 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 914 (1964) (dismissal
after 28 years service because of an allegedly mistaken diagnosis by the employer's physi-
cian); Mitchell v. Stanolind Pipe Line Co., 184 F.2d 837 (10th Cir. 1950) (employee fired for
filing a tort claim against a fellow employee); DeMarco v. Publix Super Mkts., Inc., 360 So.
2d 134 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied, 367 So. 2d 1123 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1979) (em-
ployee terminated allegedly because his daughter brought a personal injury action against
the employer); Simmons v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 311 So. 2d 28 (La. Ct. App. 1975)
(foreman with 25 years seniority discharged without notice or hearing for alleged "unsatis-
factory performance"); see Portable Elec. Tools, Inc. v. NLRB, 309 F.2d 423 (7th Cir. 1962);
Swaffield v. Universal Ecsco Corp., 271 Cal. App. 2d 147, 76 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1969); Mallard
v. Boring, 182 Cal. App. 2d 390, 6 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1960); Georgia Power Co. v. Busbin, 242
Ga. 612, 250 S.E.2d 442 (1978) (per curiam); Runyan v. Economics Lab. Inc., 147 Ga. App.
53, 248 S.E.2d 44 (1978); Harp v. Bureau of Unemployment Comp., 12 Ohio Misc. 34, 230
N.E.2d 376 (1976).
By the early twentieth century, the absolute power of the employer to discharge an at-
will employee had been raised to a constitutional right. In Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1
(1915), the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a Kansas state law that outlawed the
firing of employees for union membership. Id. at 26. The Court relied on Adair v. United
States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908), which held a similar federal statute unconstitutional. Id. at 180.
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Erosion of the Theory Underlying the At- Will Doctrine
With the development of an industrial and technologically ad-
vanced America, it became clear that the individual employee and
the employer generally did not have equal bargaining power.3 2 The
inferiority of the employee's position may be attributed to the im-
mobility of the worker,3 3 which was then and is now the result of
several factors. First, and most important, the employee character-
istically relies only on his employment for his livelihood.3 4 Sec-
ondly, the worker typically accrues retirement, medical, vacation,
and other benefits in direct relation to his longevity in a particular
position.3 5 The value of the benefits can be substantial, and when
considered in conjunction with the progressive-with-time nature of
most pay scales, they can further impede the mobility of the aver-
age laborer.3 A third factor tending to restrict the ability of work-
ers to change jobs freely is specialization. 7 As the employee's work
Although the Court later overruled these cases and upheld the power of Congress to protect
union activities, NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), it specifically
noted that its decision would not affect the right of the employer to fire for any reason other
than union activity. Id. at 45-46.
11 Although the rapid expansion of the early American industrial economy created jobs
at a rate sufficient to provide work for those displaced as a result of technological advances
and, at the same time, accomodated the increase in the size of the work force caused by a
substantially increasing population, this situation was short lived. Y. BRENNER, supra note
20, at 210-11. Inevitably, the number of qualified workers began to exceed the number of
available positions. As a result, the employer acquired significant leverage in negotiating
employment contracts. The effects of the inequality in bargaining position were shown in
the long hours and poor working conditions experienced by most of the labor force. As late
as 1920, for example, the steel industry worked a 12-hour day and a 72-hour week, with a
24-hour shift every two weeks. J. GALBRAITH, supra note 20, at 114-15.
'3 See J. GALBRAITH, supra note 20, at 114-15; Blades, supra note 20, at 1405.
31 Feinman, supra note 23, at 132.
"I See Holmans, Fringe Benefits in the United States, in FRINGE BENEFITS, LABOUR
COSTS AND SOCIAL SECURITY 124-44 (G. Reid & D. Robertson eds. 1965). See generally H.
MACAULAY, JR., FRINGE BENEFITS AND THEIR FEDERAL TAX TREATMENT 3-18 (1959). It has
been estimated, for example, that the cost of employee benefits in the public and private
sectors adds about 33% to the average payroll. M. MEYER & H. Fox, PROFILE OF EMPLOYEE
BENEFITS 1 (1974).
" This is supported by data collected in the 1970 Census which indicated that young
workers are the most mobile members of the labor force. For example, among male workers
aged 20-29 in 1965, 51.4% of them had changed jobs at least once by 1970. In contrast, the
percentage of those who had changed in the 30-39 age group (37.5%) and the over 60 age
group (12%) decreased significantly and in direct proportion to their ages. BNA [1977] LA-
BOR RELATIONS Y.B. 59.
37 "[A] change of occupational specialty usually requires some degree of risk and may
require long-term investment in retraining." U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT & TRAINING
ADMINISTRATION, EMPLOYMENT AND TRAINING REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 135 (1976).
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becomes more specialized, the range of employment opportunities
for which he is qualified diminishes.38 Thus, mutuality of obliga-
tion, which relied on substantial equality of bargaining power be-
tween parties to a contractual relation, no longer remains persua-
sive as a justification of the at-will doctrine.39
It has long been recognized that as an unexpected product of
freedom of bargaining, the employer's unfettered power of dis-
charge has enabled him to influence significantly the activities of
his employees. 40 Fear of dismissal provides the employer with the
power to affect the conduct of the employee in matters having lit-
tle or no connection with the workplace. 41 Thus, the ability to ter-
minate the employment relation has proven to be a potent tool in
the hands of the unscrupulous employer. Moreover, since this in-
fluence may be implicit as well as explicit, even the ethical em-
ployer has the potential to control the nonwork-related lives of his
employees.42
LEGISLATIVE RESTRICTION OF THE EMPLOYER'S ABSOLUTE RIGHT OF
DISCHARGE
The first major legislative break with the at-will rule came
with the passage of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935
(NLRA).43 In addition to fostering the growth of collective bar-
" See, e.g., Hudson Foam Latex Prods., Inc. v. Aiken, 82 N.J. Super. 508, 512-13, 198
A.2d 136, 138-39 (1964). See also Blake, Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARv.
L. REv. 625 (1960).
11 The principle of mutuality of obligation has fallen into disfavor among commenta-
tors, see J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 4-14 (2d ed. 1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 81 (Tent. Draft 1973); 1 S. WILLISTON, supra note 26, § 105A. In addition,
statutes such as the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976); see notes 43-46 and accompanying
text infra, which limit the right of the employer to discharge employees with no correspond-
ing restriction of the employee's authority to terminate his employment, display little con-
cern over the lack of mutuality. Nevertheless, mutuality of obligation is asserted as a viable
rationale for the at-will doctrine.
40 J. GALBRAITH, supra note 20, at 114-15; Blades, supra note 20, at 1404-10; see Note,
A Common Law Action for the Abusively Discharged Employee, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1435,
1443-46 (1975).
Blades, supra note 20, at 1406 (citing W.E. MOORE, THE CONDUCT OF THE CORPORA-
TION 28 (1962)).
42 An employee's mere knowledge of the employer's right to discharge may result in
alteration of conduct to insure that this power will not be used against him.
41 Act of July 5, 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§
151-169 (1976)). Congress was cognizant of "[tihe inequality of bargaining power between
employees who do not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and
employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership association
.... " Id., § 151; see American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 316 (1965); Fafnir
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gaining agreements, 4 the NLRA prohibits an employer from dis-
criminating in employment to deter union membership.45 This
statutory restriction of the employer's right of discharge is espe-
cially significant because, where it is found that an employee has
been wrongfully dismissed, one of the remedies available to him is
reinstatement. 46 Similar laws have been enacted in many states,
47
and parallel statutes have extended like protection to a majority of
public employees.'8
Since 1935, both the states and the federal government have
continued to limit the employer's formerly absolute power of dis-
charge. For example, veterans,49 debtors,50 the elderly,51 and ju-
rors52 are statutorily protected from wrongful dismissal. Other
laws, such as those prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race,
color, religion, national origin, or sex,53 although not expressly di-
rected toward remedying the inequalities inherent in the employ-
Bearing Co. v. NLRB, 362 F.2d 716, 717 (2d Cir. 1966). Since its enactment, the courts have
realized that an important purpose of the NLRA is to protect the employee from improper
discharge. Stewart Die Casting Corp. v. NLRB, 132 F.2d 801, 804 (7th Cir. 1942); see NLRB
v. Milk Drivers Local 338, 531 F.2d 1162, 1163 (2d Cir. 1976) (citing Radio Officers' Union v.
NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 39-42 (1954)); Evans v. American Fed'n of Television & Radio Artists,
354 F. Supp. 823, 847 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Buckley v. Ameri-
can Fed'n of Television & Radio Artists, 496 F.2d 305 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1093
(1974).
14 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976); see, e.g., Valley Mould & Iron Corp. v. NLRB, 116 F.2d 760
(7th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 590 (1941); Fort Wayne Corrugated Paper Co. v.
NLRB, 111 F.2d 869 (7th Cir. 1940).
"5 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1976); accord NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1
(1937).
48 See 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1976).
17 E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 31-101 to 31-111b (West 1972 & Supp. 1980) (Con-
necticut Labor Relations Act); N.Y. LABOR LAW §§ 700-717 (McKinney 1977) (New York
State Labor Relations Act).
48 Under federal regulation, for example, civil service employees may not be dismissed
except "for unacceptable performance," 5 U.S.C. § 4303(a) (Supp. II 1978), or "for such
cause as will promote the efficiency of the [civil] service." 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a) (Supp. II 1978).
See generally Chaturvedi, Legal Protection Available to Federal Employees Against
Wrongful Dismissal, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 287 (1968); Isbell, Carter's Civil Service Reform: 35
Percent Ifs, Buts & Maybes, 5 Civ. LIB. REv. 6 (1978); Lanzarone, Teacher Tenure-Some
Proposals for Change, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 526 (1974).
" Veterans Preference Act, 38 U.S.C. § 2021 (1976); see Carter v. United States, 407
F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1968). See also Summers, supra note 25, at 502.
10 Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1674(a) (1976).
" The Age Discrimination In Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976).
52 Jury System Improvement Act of 1978, § 6, 28 U.S.C. § 1875 (Supp. II 1978).
11 See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976); ALASKA
STAT. § 18.80.220 (1962); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1420(a) (Deering 1976); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §
955 (Purdon Supp. 1979-1980).
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ment relationship, also have circumscribed the employer's author-
ity to fire an employee. 4
Notwithstanding these significant limitations, the essence of
the at-will doctrine, the arbitrary power of dismissal, has not been
eviscerated. The extension of legislative safeguards has been a
piecemeal affair; indeed no state has gone so far as to bar wrongful
or abusive discharges.5 5 By default, the judiciary has begun a per-
ceptible move toward further limiting the operation of the at-will
doctrine.56
JUDICIAL EXCEPTIONS TO THE AT-WILL DOCTRINE
Early Cases
The first major judicial limitation of the at-will doctrine57 was
54 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976), makes it an un-
lawful employment practice to discharge an employee because of his race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin, or because the employee opposed any practice made unlawful by
Title VII, or made a charge or otherwise participated in any investigation, proceeding or
hearing under Title VII, id. §§ 2000e-2(a), 2000e-3(a) (1976).
11 In contrast to the United States, many other countries provide much broader protec-
tion to employees. Summers, supra note 25, at 508-19.
56 It has been asserted that judicial limitation of the at-will doctrine is the "best"
means. See Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 188, 319 A.2d 174, 182 (1974)
(Roberts, J., dissenting); note 107 and accompanying text infra. But see Summers, supra
note 25.
57 Some of the earlier cases circumvented the operation of the at-will rule, not by creat-
ing exceptions to it, but by finding that the employment was not for an indefinite term. For
example, several courts, although acknowledging the "American rule" that a contractual
provision stating compensation in terms of a specific time period does not create a presump-
tion of employment for that length of time, see note 15 supra, have held that when consid-
ered with other relevant circumstances, the compensation clause may support an inference
of a hiring for such period. E.g., Testard v. Penn-Jersey Auto Stores Inc., 154 F. Supp. 160,
(E.D. Pa. 1956); Holcomb & Hoke Mfg. Co. v. Younge, 103 Ind. App. 439, 8 N.E.2d 426
(1937); Fountain v. Oreck's, Inc., 245 Minn. 202, 71 N.W.2d 646 (1955); Henkel v. Educa-
tional Research Council of America, 45 Ohio St. 2d 249, 344 N.E.2d 118 (1976).
Some courts have even subscribed to the "English rule" that if compensation is ex-
pressed in terms of a time period, it is presumed that the hiring is for a definite term equal
to the specified period. Chas. S. Stifft Co. v. Florsheim, 203 Ark. 1043, 159 S.W.2d 748
(1942); Putnam v. Producers' Live Stock Mktg. Ass'n, 256 Ky. 196, 75 S.W.2d 1075 (1934);
Shenn v. Fair-Tex Mills, Inc., 26 App. Div. 2d 282, 273 N.Y.S.2d 876 (1st Dep't 1966);
Delzell v. Pope, 200 Tenn. 641, 294 S.W.2d 690 (1956). See also Adams v. Fitzpatrick, 125
N.Y. 124, 26 N.E. 143 (1891).
Other courts have forestalled the application of the at-will doctrine by enforcing con-
tracts purporting to make the employment permanent. Although the general rule is that a
contract for permanent employment is for an indefinite period and therefore falls within the
ambit of the at-will rule, see note 15 supra, where the employee has given consideration in
addition to the services for which he was hired, the courts have stated that the contract of
employment was enforceable and valid and not terminable at the will of either party. E.g.,
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announced in 1959 by a California appellate court in Petermann v.
Teamsters Local 396.58 The plaintiff claimed that the employer
had instructed him to commit perjury and that he was fired be-
cause of his refusal to do so. The Petermann court acknowledged
that an employment agreement that fails to specify a fixed period
of duration is generally terminable at the will of either party.
60
Nevertheless, the court decided that in order fully to effectuate
California's public policy against perjury, a restriction of the em-
ployer's power to discharge was necessary."1  Accordingly,
Petermann was held to have stated a cause of action for breach of
the employment contract.6
2
The Petermann decision represented a significant, albeit lim-
ited, break with the absoluteness of the at-will doctrine. The court
proclaimed that where the dismissal of an at-will employee violates
the public policy of the state as expressed by statute, the employee
may recover damages. Significantly, the Petermann panel appar-
ently accorded little weight to the absence of a corresponding in-
fringement on the employee's right to terminate the at-will
relationship."
Several years after Petermann was decided, the Indiana Su-
preme Court similarly allowed an at-will employee to pursue a
wrongful discharge action against his former employer. In
Pierce v. Tennessee C.I. & R. Co., 173 U.S. 1 (1899); Baltimore & O.R. Co. v. Foar, 84 F.2d
67 (7th Cir. 1936); Schroeder v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 448 F. Supp. 910 (E.D. Mich. 1977);
Ruinello v. Murray, 36 Cal. 2d 687, 227 P.2d 251 (1951). Where a permanent employment
has been held valid, the employer may terminate only for cause. See Maloney v. E.I. Du-
Pont de Nemours & Co., 352 F.2d 936 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 948 (1966);
Stevens v. G.L. Rugo & Sons, Inc., 209 F.2d 135 (1st Cir. 1953); F. S. Royster Guano Co. v.
Hall, 68 F.2d 533 (4th Cir. 1934); Mowbray v. Gould, 83 App. Div. 255, 82 N.Y.S. 102 (1st
Dep't 1903). Since mere refusal of other employment is not sufficient "additional considera-
tion" to make a contract for permanent employment enforceable, this exception rarely is
available to the average wage earner. See, e.g., Milligan v. Union Corp., 87 Mich. App. 179,
274 N.W.2d 10 (1978).
' 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
Id. at 187, 344 P.2d at 26.
o8 Id. at 188, 344 P.2d at 27.
01 Id. at 189, 344 P.2d at 27. The court noted that the presence of criminal sanctions
normally would be sufficient to deter both the employer and the employee from committing
perjury. Observing that the public policy against perjury would be undermined if an em-
ployee could lose his job for defying his employer's order to commit the offense, the
Petermann court held that the civil law must assist the advancement of California's public
policy against perjury by restricting the at-will employer's otherwise absolute power of dis-
charge. Id.
62 Id. at 192, 344 P.2d at 28.
63 See note 39 supra.
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Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 4 the court held that a dis-
missal in contravention of the state's public policy as announced in
its worker's compensation act65 constituted "an intentional, wrong-
ful act on the part of the employer" for which the employee was
entitled to full compensation in damages.66 It was not until 1974,
however, that the courts began to explore the possibility of carving
out an exception to the at-will rule that was not confined to statu-
torily pronounced mandates of public policy. The highest courts in
New Hampshire, Pennsylvania and Massachusetts addressed the
question and arrived at different conclusions.
The first case, Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co.,67 was an action for
breach of contract. 8 The plaintiff claimed that when she refused
to go out with her foreman, he embarked on a program of demo-
tion and harassment with the acquiescence of the company's per-
sonnel manager.0 9 Ultimately, the plaintiff was discharged.7 0 Sus-
taining the plaintiff's judgment, 1 the New Hampshire Supreme
Court proclaimed:
We hold that a termination by the employer of a contract of em-
ployment at will which is motivated by bad faith or malice or
based on retaliation is not in the best interest of the economic
system or the public good and constitutes a breach of the employ-
ment contract. 2
64 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973).
65 The plaintiff was discharged without explanation after she received a settlement for
a claim filed under the state's worker's compensation law. Id. at 250, 297 N.E.2d at 426.
Frampton alleged that she had been discharged solely in retaliation for the filing. Id. at 253,
297 N.E.2d at 428.
66 Id. at 253, 297 N.E.2d at 428. The court stated that although at-will employees gen-
erally may be dismissed without cause, when the discharge results solely from the em-
ployee's exercise of a "statutorily conferred right an exception to the general rule must be
recognized." Id. Analogizing the Frampton case to a landlord-tenant action for "retaliatory
eviction," the court concluded that fear of retaliation for filing a worker's compensation
claim "undermines a critically important public policy." Id. at 252-53, 297 N.E.2d at 428.
6 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
66 Id. at 130, 316 A.2d at 550.
66 Id. at 131-32, 316 A.2d at 550-51.
10 Id. at 131-32, 316 A.2d at 551.
7 Id. at 134, 316 A.2d at 552.
72 Id. at 133, 316 A.2d at 551.
The dissent in Monge took issue with "the broad new unprecedented law laid down" by
the majority. Id. at 135, 316 A.2d at 553 (Grimes, J., dissenting). Justice Grimes declared
that neither Petermann nor Frampton, see notes 58-66 and accompanying text supra, sup-
ported the majority's holding. 114 N.H. at 135-36, 316 A.2d at 553 (Grimes, J., dissenting).
The dissent also noted that Monge was a union member and that she failed to pursue the
grievance procedure prescribed in the collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 136, 316 A.2d
EMPLOYMENT AT- WILL
The court cited the Petermann and Frampton holdings as support
for its decision.7 3 Unlike these cases, however, there was no statu-
tory public policy prohibiting the discharge in Monge. Rather, the
New Hampshire court announced an expansive public policy ex-
ception to the at-will doctrine that was not limited to legislative
declarations of public policy.74 Another significant aspect of the de-
cision in Monge was the court's recognition of the importance of
achieving a proper balance between the interests of the employer
in efficiently managing his business and that of the employee in
retaining his employment.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court was presented an opportu-
nity to adopt a similar broad public policy exception to the at-will
rule in Geary v. United States Steel Corp.76 George Geary, em-
ployed as a salesman by the United States Steel Corporation for 14
years,7 7 questioned the safety of one of the company's new prod-
ucts since, in Geary's opinion, it had been inadequately tested.
When the plaintiff informed his superiors of his concern,"" he was
told to "follow directions. 7 9 Geary agreed to do so, but later ex-
pressed his misgivings about the new product to a vice president in
charge of sales.80 Allegedly because of his efforts to ensure that
only a safe product be marketed, Geary was discharged."1 He then
brought an action against his former employer, in which he sought
compensatory and punitive damages for injury to his reputation in
the industry, for mental anguish, and for financial harm.
2
at 553. Although union members must exhaust the grievance machinery as a prerequisite to
seeking judicial relief, the argument apparently was never made in this case. See Note, A
Common Law Action for the Abusively Discharged Employee, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1435, 1437
n.9 (1975).
73 114 N.H. at 133, 316 A.2d at 551.
74 See generally Note, A Common Law Action for the Abusively Discharged Employee,
26 HASTINGS L.J. 1435 (1975); Comment, Employment Contract Terminable at Will: Monge
v. Beebe Rubber Co. and Bad Faith Discharges, 63 Ky. L.J. 513 (1975); 16 B.C. INDUS. &
Com. L. REV. 232 (1975); 7 CONN. L. REV. 758 (1975); 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 300 (1974).
71 114 N.H. at 133, 316 A.2d at 551 (citing Note, California's Controls on Employer
Abuse of Employee Rights, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1015 (1970)). The court believed that its ruling
would not interfere with the legitimate concerns of either the employer or employee. 114
N.H. at 133, 316 A.2d at 551-52.
70 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974).
7 Id. at 173, 319 A.2d at 175.
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 Id. As a result of his efforts, the product was re-evaluated and withdrawn from the
market. Id. at 173-74, 319 A.2d at 175.
sl Id. at 174, 316 A.2d at 175.
82 Id.
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The court first recognized the traditional rule that absent a
provision to the contrary, the law has "taken for granted" the
power of either party to an at-will employment contract to termi-
nate the relationship for any or no reason.83 Addressing the argu-
ment that the defendant's conduct constituted the tortious act of
"malicious abuse of recognized rights, ' 4 the court stated that the
cause of action requires "an element of specific intent to cause
harm or accomplish an ulterior purpose. 8 5 Geary, however, had
failed to satisfy his burden of proof.8 6 Nevertheless the Geary
court opined that "there are areas of an employee's life in which
his employer has no legitimate interest." Although a cause of ac-
tion might be premised upon an intrusion into one of these areas
83 Id. at 175, 319 A.2d at 176. The court cited as support the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §
762 (1939) which states:
One who causes intended or unintended harm to another merely by refusing
to enter into a business relation with the other or to continue a business relation
terminable at his will is not liable for that harm if the refusal is not
(a) a breach of the actor's duty to the other arising from the nature of
the actor's business or from a legislative enactment, or
(b) a means of accomplishing an illegal effect on competition, or
(c) part of a concerted refusal by a combination of persons of which he
is a member.
Conceding that economic conditions have changed radically since the formulation of the
Restatement rule, 456 Pa. at 176, 319 A.2d at 176, the court refused to grant Geary relief.
Id. at 176, 319 A.2d at 180. The majority commented: "Appellant candidly admits that he is
beckoning us into uncharted territory. No court in this Commonwealth has ever recognized
a non-statutory cause of action for an employer's termination of an at-will employment rela-
tionship." Id. at 174, 319 A.2d at 175.
84 Id. at 178, 319 A.2d at 177.
85 Id.
88 Id. at 179, 319 A.2d at 177-78. Refusing to hold that the tort requires only a showing
of general intent "in the sense that an employer knew or should have known the probable
consequences of his act" the court stated that such a rule essentially would nullify an em-
ployer's right of discharge "for some degree of harm is normally foreseeable whenever an
employee is dismissed." Id. at 178, 319 A.2d at 177. Moreover, the court observed that a
general intent theory might permit an employer to interfere with an employee's right to
change jobs. Id. at 178 n.8, 319 A.2d at 177 n.8.
Similarly, the court was not convinced by Geary's contention that, because he had acted
in the best interests of the public and his employer, he should be protected from dismissal
in retaliation for questioning the marketing of a potentially dangerous product. Id. at 181,
319 A.2d at 178. Since Geary was neither responsible for nor qualified to make an expert
judgment in matters of product safety, id., 319 A.2d at 178-79, the court considered his
argument equivalent to a claim for protection from dismissal based on his good intentions,
id. at 181, 319 A.2d at 179. The court concluded, however, that "[t]he everpresent threat of
suit"-a likely result of recognizing a cause of action based upon such a claim-could inter-
fere with an employer's legitimate hiring process and normal operational procedures. Id. at
181-82, 319 A.2d at 179-80.
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through the employer's power of discharge, 7 the court held that to
be actionable, the intrusion would have to violate a "clear mandate
of public policy," a criterion not met under the facts.88
A few years after Geary was decided, the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts considered the issue. In Fortune v. Na-
tional Cash Register Co.,"9 a salesman with 40 years of service al-
leged that his employer had discharged him to avoid paying com-
missions on a five million dollar sale. 0 While the plaintiff admitted
that his employment was at-will, he contended that the dismissal
was in bad faith and constituted a breach of the employment con-
tract.9 1 The defendant, in contrast, argued that an at-will em-
ployer's motives in terminating the employment relationship are
irrelevant.9 2 The court held that the employer's reasons for the dis-
missal could be considered by the jury because the plaintiff's con-
tract "contain[ed] an implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing and a termination not made in good faith [would] constitut[e]
a breach. . . ."3 Emphasizing the exceptions that had been fash-
V Id. at 184, 319 A.2d at 180.
"8 Id. at 184-85, 319 A.2d at 180. The court specifically declined to adopt a broad public
policy exception to the at-will doctrine.
Justice Roberts vigorously dissented, contending that Geary's discharge offended the
public policy of Pennsylvania and that a cause of action for a wrongful discharge should
thus be recognized. Noting that courts have granted relief to persons injured by defective
merchandise and that the plaintiff had played an important role in removing a potentially
dangerous product from the market, id. at 188, 319 A.2d at 181 (Roberts, J., dissenting),
Justice Roberts stated that the majority neglected to consider that prevention of injury is a
"substantial, clear, and compelling" objective of society, id. at 194, 319 A.2d at 185 (Roberts,
J., dissenting) (citing RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTS § 402A (1965)). Stressing the judici-
ary's obligation "to fashion remedies for the changing circumstances of economic and social
reality, id. at 193, 319 A.2d at 185 (Roberts, J., dissenting), the dissent also declared that
the "time has surely come to afford unorganized employees an opportunity to prove in court
a claim for arbitrary and retaliatory discharge," id. at 188, 319 A.2d at 182 (Roberts, J.,
dissenting).
19 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977).
0 Id. at 99-100, 364 N.E.2d at 1253-54.
9" Under his employment arrangement with the defendant, Fortune would receive part
of the bonus due on sales if a sales territory was assigned to him at the date of the order,
and part if the territory was assigned to him at the date of the delivery and installation; if
the territory was assigned to him at both times, he would receive the full bonus. Id. at 97-98,
364 N.E.2d at 1253. Fortune alleged that his dismissal was motivated by a desire on the part
of the defendant to deprive him of the second part of a commission on the sale of merchan-
dise. Id. The trial court, holding for the plaintiff, awarded him $45,649.62, the stipulated
amount of unpaid bonuses. Id. at 101-02 & nn.6-7, 364 N.E.2d at 1255 & nn.6-7.
92 Id. at 101, 364 N.E.2d at 1255.
93 Id. at 101; 364 N.E.2d at 1256. The court stated that the implied covenant of good
faith would not impede the flexibility that an employer must be accorded in running his
business and making personnel decisions. Id.
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ioned by the judiciary to avoid the "rigidity" of the at-will rule,9'
the court cited Monge as standing for the proposition that
in every cdntract there is an implied covenant that neither party
shall do anything which will have the effect of destroying or injur-
ing the right of the other party to receive the fruits of the con-
tract, which means that in every contract there exists an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 95
The Fortune court, however, refused to predict future "adherence
to so broad a policy," nor would it "speculate .. .whether the
good faith requirement is implicit in every contract for employ-
ment at will." '96 Rather, the court specifically limited its holding to
the facts of the case. 7
Recent Case Trends
The dissatisfaction with the employment-at-will doctrine con-
tinues to grow, and the number of jurisdictions creating exceptions
has increased accordingly.9 8 While there has been no general ac-
Id. at 102, 364 N.E.2d at 1256. The court noted that while some courts have fash-
ioned a remedy in tort, see, e.g., Montalvo v. Zamora, 7 Cal. App. 3d 69, 86 Cal. Rptr. 401
(1970); Petermann v. Teamsters Local 396, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959);
Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Nees v. Hocks, 272
Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975), it would proceed in this case on the basis of breach of contract.
373 Mass. at 102, 364 N.E.2d at 1256. For a discussion of the various causes of action used
to limit the arbitrary power of dismissal given the employer under the at-will doctrine, see
notes 119-143 and accompanying text infra.
95 373 Mass. at 104, 364 N.E.2d at 1257 (emphasis in original) (quoting Kirke La Shelle
Co. v. Paul Armstrong Co., 263 N.Y. 79, 87, 188 N.E. 163, 167 (1933)).
98 373 Mass. at 104, 364 N.E.2d at 1257.
Id. at 104-05, 364 N.E.2d at 1257. The court stated that when a principal attempts to
deprive an agent of compensation by terminating the contractual relationship, the principal
has acted in bad faith, thus entitling the agent to his commission. Id.
98 At least 18 states have recognized the non-absoluteness of the at-will doctrine.
Eleven of these have explicitly recognized a cause of action by an at-will employee, where he
alleged that his discharge violated the public policy of the state. See Savodnik v. Korvettes,
Inc., N.Y.L.J., April 28, 1980, at 3, col. 1 (E.D. N.Y. April 23, 1980); Petermann v. Teamsters
Local 396, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 IlM. 2d 172,
384 N.E.2d 353 (1978); Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425
(1973); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977);
Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976); Monge v. Beebe Rubber
Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974); O'Sullivan v. Mallon, 160 N.J. Super. 416, 390 A.2d
149 (1978); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975) (en banc); Reuther v. Fowler &
Williams, Inc., 255 Pa. Super. Ct. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246
S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978). Courts in an additional seven states, although not yet explicitly
allowing exceptions to the at-will rule, have indicated that given proper circumstances they
would be amenable to recognizing a limitation to the at-will doctrine. See Moore v. Home
Ins. Co., 601 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir. 1979)(Arizona); Lampe v. Presbyterian Medical Center, 41
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ceptance of the broad public policy exception promulgated by the
Monge court,9 9 the cases that have permitted at-will employees to
state causes of action for wrongful discharge have not limited
themselves to the "clear mandate of public policy" requirement of
Geary. Thus, these decisions have allowed recovery even where a
dismissal did not contravene a statutory public policy.100 Instead,
the courts have accepted and rejected specific limitations to the at-
will rule in an attempt to protect the legitimate concerns of both
the employer and the employee under the particular facts.101 Un-
derlying this judicial circumscription of the at-will doctrine, how-
ever, is a slow expansion of the idea that all discharged employees,
regardless of their at-will status, are entitled to judicial redress
where termination of their employment transgresses a substantial
public policy. Thus, at-will employees have been found to state
causes of action where they were discharged for refusal to commit
an unlawful or unethical act,10 2 for asserting certain statutory
Colo. App. 465, 590 P.2d 513, (1978); Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 98 Idaho 330, 563
P.2d 54 (1977); Abrisz v. Pulley Freight Lines, Inc., 270 N.W.2d 454 (Iowa 1978); Scroghan
v. Kraftco Corp., 551 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. 1977); Stephens v. Justiss-Mears Oil Co., 300 So. 2d
510 (La. Ct. of App. 1974); Roberts v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 88 Wash. 2d 887, 568 P.2d 764
(1977)(en banc).
" Indeed, some courts have rejected the Monge decision. E.g., Larsen v. Motor Supply
Co., 117 Ariz. 507, 573 P.2d 907 (1977); Criscione v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 66 IlM. App. 3d
664, 384 N.E.2d 91 (1978); Abrisz v. Pulley Freight Lines, Inc., 270 N.W.2d 454 (Iowa 1978).
The Washington Supreme Court, however, left open the possibility of adopting the
Monge rule. Roberts v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 88 Wash. 2d 887, 898, 568 P.2d 764, 771
(1977).
100 There was at least some indication in the Geary decision that the "clear mandate of
public policy" requirement would only be satisfied where the state's public policy was em-
bodied in statutory law. See 456 Pa. at 183 n.16, 319 A.2d at 180 n.16; Beidler v. W.R.
Grace, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 1013, 1015 (E.D. Pa. 1978). But see Davis v. United States Steel
Supply, Div. of U.S. Steel Corp., 581 F.2d 335 (3d Cir. 1978).
101 See, e.g., Crownover v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 594 F.2d 565 (6th Cir. 1979)(under
Michigan law, no exception recognized where termination based solely on economic rea-
sons); Lekich v. International Business Mach. Corp., 469 F.Supp. 485 (E.D.Pa. 1978) (no
cause of action for wrongful discharge where firing was for "plausible and legitimate" rea-
son); Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 98 Idaho 330, 563 P.2d 54 (1977)(exception rec-
ognized for intentional infringement of public policy) (dictum); Scroghan v. Kraftco Corp.,
551 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. 1977)(exception to at-will rule limited to matters of public concern);
Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 166 N.J. Super. 335, 399 A.2d 1023 (1979)(exception
recognized where employee discharged for following a "reasonably supportable ethical stan-
dard"); Nees v, Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975)(exception to at-will doctrine where
dismissal based upon a "socially undesirable" motive).
102 In light of Petermann, it is clear that "[i]t would be obnoxious to the interests of
the state and contrary to public policy and sound morality to allow an employer to dis-
charge an employee... on the ground that the employee declined to commit ... an act
specifically enjoined by statute." Petermann, 174 Cal. App. 2d at 188-89, 344 P.2d at 27.
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rights, 03 for absence from work because of jury duty service in
state courts, 04 and for "blowing the whistle" on illegal employer
activities.10
5
Thus, there has been little trouble recognizing a limitation to the at-will rule based on a
discharge in retaliation for an employee's refusal to commit an illegal act. See Schroeder v.
Dayton-Hudson Corp., 448 F. Supp. 910, 916 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Jackson v. Minidoka Irriga-
tion Dist., 98 Idaho 330, 333-34, 563 P.2d 54, 57 (1977); Trombetta v. Detroit, Toledo, Iron-
ton R.R., 81 Mich. App. 489, 495, 265 N.W.2d 385, 388 (1978); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69
Mich. App. 644, 651, 245 N.W.2d 151, 155 (1976); O'Sullivan v. Mallon, 160 N.J. Super. 416,
418, 390 A.2d 149, 150 (1978).
Although the courts have been less receptive to recognizing an exception to the at-will
doctrine where the termination was based upon the employee's refusal to perform an uneth-
ical act, see, e.g., Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hosp., 352 So. 2d 1130, 1131 (Ala. 1977); Lampe
v. Presbyterian Medical Center, 41 Colo. App. 465, 590 P.2d 513 (1978), at least one court
has indicated that an exception should be allowed where the employer attempts to compel
the employee to violate "a reasonably supportable ethical standard," Pierce v. Ortho Phar-
maceutical Corp., 166 N.J. Super. 335, 343, 399 A.2d 1023, 1027 (1979). For a discussion
favoring adoption of an exception in this area, see Note, A Remedy for the Discharge of
Professional Employees Who Refuse to Perform Unethical or Illegal Acts: A Proposal in
Aid of Professional Ethics, 28 VAND. L. REV. 805 (1975).
103 The worker compensation cases have been the primary vehicle for limiting the at-
will doctrine where an employee was dismissed for exercising statutory rights. See, e.g., Kel-
say v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978); Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas
Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 664, 245
N.W.2d 151 (1976); notes 1-14, 64-66 and accompanying text supra. This exception to the
at-will rule has been extended to several other areas. See, e.g., Perks v. Firestone Tire &
Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979) (refusal to submit to polygraph test where statute
proscribed employer use of device); Montalvo v. Zamora, 7 Cal. App. 3d 69, 86 Cal. Rptr.
401 (1970) (exercise of rights under minimum wage law); Glen v. Clearman's Golden Cock
Inn, Inc., 192 Cal. App. 2d, 13 Cal Rptr. 769 (1961) (exercise of right to encourage
unionism).
104 Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975) (en banc); Reuther v. Fowler &
Williams, Inc., 255 Pa. Super. Ct. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978); see, e.g., Harless v. First Nat'l
Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270, 273 (W. Va. 1978). Jurors in federal court are protected from dismis-
sal for their service by statute. See 28 U.S.C. § 1875 (Supp. II 1980).
105 Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978); see Hoopes v. City of
Chester, 473 F. Supp. 1214, 1223 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1979). In Harless, the court held that the
plaintiff had stated a cause of action by alleging that he was fired because he reported viola-
tions of the consumer credit laws by his employer. 246 S.E.2d at 275. This tempering of the
at-will rule was permitted because the court found that the employer's motivation for the
discharge violated a "substantial public policy principle, viz, that of protecting consumers of
credit." 246 S.E.2d at 275-76.
A "whistle blowing" exception, however, generally has met judicial resistance. See, e.g.,
Percival v. General Motors Corp., 539 F.2d 1126 (8th Cir. 1976); Goodroe v. Georgia Power
Co., 148 Ga. App. 193, 251 S.E.2d 51 (1978); Martin v. Platt, 386 N.E.2d 1026 (Ind. Ct. App.
1979); Walsh v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 278 Or. 347, 563 P.2d 1205 (1977). Congress,
however, has accorded whistle blowers significant protection. For example, several legislative
schemes prohibit the dismissal of employees who reveal violations of their provisions. E.g.,
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (1976) (NLRA); 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (1976) (Federal Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act); 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A) (Supp. 1979) (Civil Service Reform Act of 1978). The
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 authorizes the Merit Systems Protection Board to remedy
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PROVIDING REMEDIES FOR THE WRONGFULLY DISCHARGED AT-WILL
EMPLOYEE
Standard For Dismissal
Notwithstanding the significant judicial inroads on the once
inviolable employment-at-will doctrine, the state legislatures have
failed to respond by statutorily mandating that all discharges be
supported by just cause.106 Because of the complex relationships in
any employment situation and the important interests of the em-
ployer, the employee, and society that are inevitably implicated, a
flexible, uniform standard implemented by the judiciary may be
best suited in this area of the law.107 The courts, however, have
taken approaches as inconsistent as the present legislative excep-
tions to the at-will doctrine.108 Rather than examining individual
discharges to determine if the firing contravened a substantial
public policy, it is suggested that the judiciary recognize the im-
portance of balancing the interests of both parties in the employ-
ment relationship.10 9
A standard of good faith would appear to accommodate the
retaliatory discharges caused by:
a disclosure of information by an employee ... which the employee ... reasona-
bly believes evidences-
(i) a violation of any law, rule, or regulation, or
(ii) mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of authority,
or a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety,
if such disclosure is not specifically prohibited by law and if such information is
not specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of
national defense or the conduct of foreign affairs.
Id.
These statutory proclamations evince a public policy in favor of "blowing the whistle."
It is submitted, therefore, that judicial protection for whistle blowers is warranted, for em-
ployees who expose not only illegal acts, as was the case in Harless, but also activity that
the employee reasonably believes constitutes reckless or intentional misconduct or that vio-
lates a reasonably supportable ethical standard. See generally REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE
ON PROFESSIONAL REsPONSmIuTY, WHISTLE BLOWING (1972).
106 But cf. GA. CODE ANN. § 66-101 (1979) (payment of wages for a stipulated period
raises a presumption that hiring is for same period). While no states have abrogated the
doctrine, the territory of Puerto Rico has abolished the at-will rule, substituting a standard
of good cause. See P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29, § 185a (Supp. 1978).
107 See Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 166 N.J. Super 335, 342, 399 A.2d 1023,
1026 (1979); Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. at 188, 319 A.2d at 185 (Roberts, J.
dissenting); Blades, supra note 20, at 1407.
108 Compare notes 43-56 and accompanying text supra with notes 98-105 and accompa-
nying text supra.
"' See Fortune, 373 Mass. at 102, 364 N.E.2d at 1256; Monge, 114 N.H. at 133, 316
A.2d at 551.
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often-competing interests of the employer and the employee110 and
thus should be employed.""" Accordingly, only where the dismissal
was in bad faith would an employee be entitled to recover. A find-
ing of bad faith would be improper where the employer can estab-
lish a legitimate business purpose for discharging an at-will em-
ployee. The good faith standard, thereby, would afford the
employer with the wide discretion in the hiring and firing process
that is necessitated by the vicissitudes of the business world. 12
Moreover, because the employer's decision to discharge sometimes
may involve considerations of a highly subjective nature, the
factfinder should never be permitted to presume bad faith.113 To
110 One author who posited that the employer's interest in "efficiency" and the em-
ployee's concern with "security" are inherently conflicting reasoned:
For the employer, the corner-stone of the employment contract in our system
of economic organization is his "right" to discharge. That "right" is necessary to
reinforce the "right" of command, legitimated in capitalist ideology as an attri-
bute of private ownership, to protect production against "disruptive" conduct, and
to organize operations so as to extract the maximum profit. . . . For the em-
ployee, dismissal is the capital punishment of industry. He and his family face the
possibility of a long period of economic hardship. . and grave social and psycho-
logical upheavals, particularly if he has to uproot his family to a new area in
search of work.
England, Recent Developments in Wrongful Dismissal Laws and Some Pointers For Re-
form, 16 ALBERTA L. REv. 470, 470 (1978) (footnote omitted).
III The good faith standard would greatly contribute to safeguarding the interests of
the at-will employee in his job security. See Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. at 133,
316 A.2d at 551-52. In addition, it has been observed that the "just cause" standard permits
the employer to proscribe employee conduct, within reasonable bounds, and to specify em-
ployee activity adequate for dismissal. See Summers, supra note 25, at 501-02. Thus, it is
clear that the less restrictive good faith standard of liability would not "interfere with the
employer's normal exercise of his right to discharge, which is necessary to permit him to
operate his business efficiently and profitably." Monge, 114 N.H. at 133, 316 A.2d at 552.
112 Fortune, 373 Mass. at 102, 364 N.E.2d at 1256; accord, Percival v. General Motors
Corp., 539 F.2d 1126, 1130 (8th Cir. 1976). Attempts to narrow the application of the at-will
rule sometimes have been challenged because of fear of the harmful consequences of placing
limitations on the right of an employer to run his business. Early in the twentieth century,
similar apprehensions caused the elevation of the power of discharge to a constitutional
right. See Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 11 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161,
172 (1908), discussed at note 31 supra. The notion that the employer's absolute right to
discharge is constitutionally protected, however, has long been discredited, see NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 43-49 (1937), and it has become increasingly ap-
parent that it is the employee, not the employer, who needs to be safeguarded in the em-
ployment relation, see notes 32-42 and accompanying text supra.
"IS In some situations, an employer may not be able to establish a good working rela-
tionship with an employee because of their differences in business standards or personali-
ties. It is suggested, therefore, that an employer should not always be required to employ
someone whom he does not like on a personal or business level. This argument seems partic-
ularly convincing in a small organization where there often is an element of interpersonal
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the contrary, the employee should be required to prove by clear
and convincing evidence that the employer was motivated solely
by reasons unconnected to any proper business interest.114
From the perspective of the at-will employee, a good faith
standard of dismissal would provide certainty and security. Al-
though dismissal based solely upon subjective dislike may not al-
ways constitute bad faith,1 5 this would be true only where the dis-
like rose to the level of interfering with the business. In addition,
the standard of good faith would extend protection to far more at-
will employees than has been accomplished by the so called "pub-
lic policy" exceptions to the at-will rule.1 16
contact between the employer and the employee. In many situations, this contact would also
be evident in larger organizations, although usually between an employee and his supervisor.
Thus, under these circumstances, dismissal based merely on subjective dislike may never-
theless be in good faith.
11 A showing of a bad faith reason for dismissal would shift the burden of coming
forward to the employer to show that there was a legitimate business reason for the firing. If
all the employee can show, however, is that one of the reasons for the discharge was wrong-
ful, he will not have proved bad faith discharge. See, e.g., Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich.
App. 644, 650, 245 N.W.2d 151, 154-55 (1976) (Allen, J., concurring).
116 See note 113 supra.
116 Since broad circumscription of the at-will doctrine under a good faith standard
would do much to protect the interest of all employees in retaining their jobs, it might be
feared that the future vitality and growth of labor organizations will be threatened. See,
e.g., Peck, Unjust Discharges From Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1, 3 (1979). Similar to the erosion of the at-will doctrine, the labor union movement
developed as a result of the evils generated by the operation of the at-will doctrine to the
disparate relationship between the employer and the employee. W. BAER, DIscn'LINE AND
DISCHARGE UNDER THE LABOR AGREEMENT 1 (1972); Note, A Common Law Action for the
Abusively Discharged Employee, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1435, 1448 (1975); see American Steel
Foundries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 209 (1921); S. COHEN, LABOR IN
THE UNITED STATES 61-62 (2d ed. 1966); J. KuczYNsKi, A SHORT HISTORY OF LABOUR CoNDI-
TIONS UNDER INDUSTRIAL CAPITALISM IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 115-23 (1973). In-
deed, Congress apparently considered the need for reform to be so urgent that it enacted
the NLRA-a statutory exception to the at-will doctrine-to encourage union membership.
See notes 43-48 and accompanying text supra. The concept that restriction of the em-
ployer's formerly absolute ability to terminate the employment relation poses a threat to
future union activity, however, does not survive analysis. While it is true that an important
objective of unions and the collective bargaining agreements they negotiate, job security,
would to a large extent be satisfied by abolition of the at-will rule, see Peck, supra, at 3, the
worker receives much more than employment security from membership in a labor union.
Section 9(a) of the NLRA designates "pay, wages, hours of employment, [and] other condi-
tions of employment" as proper subjects for collective bargaining. The courts have inter-
preted these terms broadly and, therefore, bargaining contracts often provide for pension
plans, vacations, holidays, bonus sytems, health and welfare programs, promotions and
wages, and seniority benefits. See generally BUREAU OF NAT'L AFFAIRS, INC., BASIC PATTERNS
IN UNION CONTRACTS (9th ed. 1979). Additionally, even in the area of job security, the pro-
tection offered by labor unions is generally superior to that available under a private cause
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Theories of Recovery
At-will employees seeking recovery for wrongful discharge
have utilized both contract and tort causes of action. 117 An impor-
tant criterion to weigh in determining an appropriate theory is the
damages available. One important consideration is whether puni-
tive damages can be recovered, since such damages appear neces-
sary to deter the abusive exercise of the at-will employer's power
to terminate the employment relationship. 1 8 It is submitted,
therefore, that unless a cause of action makes punitive damages
available, it is an inadequate means of protecting the interest of
the at-will employee in retaining his employment.
Contract
Traditionally, the at-will doctrine was invoked to defeat ac-
tions framed in contract for lack of consideration or mutuality of
obligation.119 Modern courts, however, have begun to recognize the
contractual nature of the employment relationship, despite the in-
definite duration of the contract, and have held that wrongful ter-
mination of the status constitutes a breach. 2 0 The tendency has
been to imply in the contract a covenant to act in good faith.12" ' To
of action. See generally Weyand, Present Status of Individual Employee Rights in NEw
YORK UNIVERSITY TWENTY-SECOND ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR 171 (T. Christensen & A.
Christensen, eds. 1970); Summers, supra note 25. It is submitted, therefore, that rather than
regarding abolition of the at-will doctrine as a threat to unionism, it be viewed as serving to
fill the void in the existing artillery of protection available to the employee against today's
concentrated and often unscrupulous employer.
117 The cases that have allowed the broadest limitation of the at-will rule have done so
under a contract cause of action. Fortune, 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251; Monge, 114 N.H.
130, 316 A.2d 549. The majority of cases permitting exceptions to the at-will doctrine, how-
ever, have framed the cause of action in tort. E.g., Petermann v. Teamsters Local 396, 174
Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 IlM. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353
(1978); Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Sventko v.
Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976); O'Sullivan v. Mallon, 160 N.J.
Super. 416, 390 A.2d 149 (1978); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975) (en banc);
Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 255 Pa. Super. Ct. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978); Harless v.
First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978).
118 E.g., Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 186-87, 384 N.E.2d 353, 359 (1978);
Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 220, 536 P.2d 512, 516 (1975) (en banc); Blades, supra note 20,
at 1427.
'19 See Blades, supra note 20, at 1419-21.
120 See, e.g., Fortune, 373 Mass. at 104, 364 N.E.2d at 1257; Monge, 114 N.H. at 133,
316 A.2d at 551.
121 E.g., Fortune, 373 Mass. at 104, 364 N.E.2d at 1256; Monge, 114 N.H. at 133, 316
A.2d at 551.
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be successful, therefore, the plaintiff must establish that his em-
ployer dismissed him in bad faith.
It is suggested that, although well suited to implementing the
good faith standard of liability, the contract cause of action never-
theless is an ineffective remedy for the wrongfully dismissed at-will
employee. 122 While the plaintiff might be awarded loss of earn-
ings1 23 and the cost of finding new employment, 124 punitive dam-
ages would be impermissible under the contract theory of recov-
ery, 1 5 as would most claims for mental anguish. 2 ' Thus, a cause of
action in contract would not provide an effective means of prevent-
ing improper dismissals in the first instance.127
22 It has been argued, for example, that a cause of action in contract is defective since
it leaves unresolved whether an implied cause of action for bad faith discharge "may be
negated by contractual disclaimers of obligations or waivers of rights." Note, A Common
Law Action for the Abusively Discharged Employee, 26 HASTINGs L.J. 1435, 1455 (1975).
123 See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 39, §§ 14-18. Computing loss of earnings
presents some difficulty in the area of at-will employment contracts. See Note, California's
Controls on Employer Abuse of Employee Political Rights, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1015, 1050-52
(1970). Useful analogy to the measure of damages available in cases where the contract
breached was for a definite term cannot be made. In those cases, the wrongfully discharged
employee generally is entitled to the salary that would have been payable during the term of
the contract, less any income that he can be expected with reasonable diligence to earn
during the remainder of the contract period. Quinn v. Straus Broadcasting Group, Inc., 309
F. Supp. 1208, 1209 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); Perry v. Apache Junction Elementary School Dist. #
43 Bd. of Trustees, 20 Ariz. App. 561, 564, 514 P.2d 514, 516 (1973); Note, California's
Controls on Employer Abuse of Employee Political Rights, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1015, 1050-52
(1970). Where a contract is for an indefinite term, however, there is some authority indicat-
ing that future damages or wages are not recoverable, see, e.g., Jeter v. Jim Waiter Homes,
Inc., 414 F. Supp. 791, 792 (W.D. Okla. 1976), and the cases that have allowed recovery of
future wages have not been consistent in measuring damages, see, e.g., Rogozinski v. Air-
stream By Angell, 152 N.J. Super. 133, 144, 377 A.2d 807, 813 (1977); Garza v. United Child
Care, Inc., 88 N.M. 30, 31, 536 P.2d 1086, 1087 (1975). One case demonstrates the extent to
which future damages might be recoverable. In Bowen v. United States Postal Serv., 470 F.
Supp. 1127 (W.D. Va. 1979), the court, in analogous circumstances, computed the damages
by using the present value of the plaintiff's anticipated earnings for the period for which the
plaintiff "could reasonably expect to be employed." Id. at 1129.
24 See, e.g., National Serv. Indus., Inc. v. Malloy, 266 So. 2d 370, 371 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1972); Vallejo v. Jamestown College, 244 N.W.2d 753, 758 (N.D. 1976); Lemlich v.
Board of Trustees, 282 Md. 495, 565 & n.5, 385 A.2d 1185, 1191 & n.5 (1978).
125 E.g., Isagholian v. Carnegie Inst., Inc., 51 Mich. App. 220, 222, 214 N.W.2d 864, 865
(1974); Cangemi v. Acton, 38 App. Div. 2d 806, 806, 328 N.Y.S.2d 882, 885 (1st Dep't 1972);
see, e.g., J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 39, § 14-3; Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for
Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1145-46 (1970).
268 E.g., Dryden v. Tri-Valley Growers, 65 Cal. App. 2d 990, 999, 135 Cal. Rptr. 720, 726
(1977); McClain v. Faraone, 369 A.2d 1090, 1094 (Del. Super. Ct. 1977); Martin v. Donald
Park Acres, Inc., 54 App. Div. 2d 975, 975, 389 N.Y.S.2d 31, 32 (2d Dep't 1976).
12 An additional reason why the contract cause of action is not an effective means of
redressing wrongfully discharged employees is the denial of the judiciary to allow specific
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Tort
In order to take advantage of the wider range of recoverable
damages, many at-will plaintiffs have framed their complaints in
tort.12 An unjustified dismissal may be considered tortious basi-
cally because it constitutes an unreasonable interference with the
interest of the employee in retaining his job. 129 Often, however, the
courts have recognized specific, limited tort causes of action, such
as the tort of discharge in retaliation for filing a worker's compen-
sation claim. 130 Such theories of recovery have done little to make
known to the at-will employer the reasons for upholding dismissals
or to alert the employee to the types of activities in which the law
will protect him from employer influence through the power of
dismissal.
Where plaintiffs have sought damages on broader tort theo-
ries, however, difficulties have arisen in overcoming the various
proof requirements of the available theories of liability. In one
case, for example, the plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to pre-
mise liability on a tort theory analogous to abuse of process.' The
essence of stating a cause of action in abuse of process, which lies
for the intentional misuse of legal process, 132 is not that the com-
performance of employment contracts. See 5A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1204 (1964). It is
suggested that specific enforcement of an at-will employment contract would, in many in-
stances, be the best method of redressing the injury caused by the breach. See Summers,
supra note 25, at 531; Note, California's Controls on Employer Abuse of Employee Political
Rights, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1015, 1047-48 (1970). For example, most collective bargaining con-
tracts provide for reinstatement of wrongfully dismissed workers, see note 116 supra, as do
some statutory schemes where employees are discharged in violation of their provisions, e.g.,
28 U.S.C. § 1875(b) (Supp. II 1980) (Jury Systems Improvements Act of 1978). Neverthe-
less, by reasoning that ordering reinstatement of an employee "would involve difficulty of
supervision and . . . forcing the continuance of a distasteful personal relationship," the
courts continue to deny specific performance of employment contracts. J. CALAMARI & J.
PERILLO, supra note 39, § 16-5. Although there may be circumstances under which specific
performance would be unfeasible, see, e.g., England, supra note 110, at 515; note 113 supra,
it is suggested that the general practicability of granting specific performance is demon-
strated by the success of reinstatement provisions in collective bargaining agreements. See
J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, supra note 39, § 16-5.
28 See note 117 supra.
129 See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 1, at 6 (4th ed. 1971). See
generally Seavey, Principles of Torts, 56 HARV. L. REV. 72 (1942).
0 Kelsay, 74 Ill. 2d at 185, 384 N.E.2d at 357.
456 Pa. at 178, 319 A.2d at 177.
122 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 682 (1977); W. PROSSER, supra note 129, §
121. See generally 1 T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 348-52 (3d ed. 1906);
Note, Abuse of Process-A Misunderstood Concept, 20 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 401 (1971); Note,
The Nature and Limitations of the Remedy Available to the Victim of a Misuse of the
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mencement of an action was unjustified, but that process was is-
sued for the purpose of accomplishing a goal other than that for
which it was designed.13 3 Thus, notwithstanding that the institu-
tion of an action was actuated by a vicious motive, a cause of ac-
tion for abuse of process will not lie where the process is used only
to its proper end.134 Similarly, it has been suggested that a cause of
action be recognized for the intentional misuse of the right to dis-
charge. Such an action would be available, it has been argued, even
if the employer otherwise had a legal right to discharge the em-
ployee. To be successful under the theory, however, the employee
would be required to prove that, the employer had "an ulterior pur-
pose" for his action.135 This requirement contemplates a firing for
the purpose of influencing some future activity of the at-will em-
ployee. Wrongful discharges, however, characteristically are made
in retaliation for some past act or refusal to act by the employee.
Thus, because of the "ulterior purpose" requirement, a tort action
analogous to abuse of process often would not be available to the
abusively discharged at-will employee.136
Legal Process: The Tort of Abuse of Process, 2 VAL. U.L. REv. 129 (1967).
133 E.g., Paint Prods. Co. v. Minwax Co., 448 F. Supp. 656, 659 (D. Conn. 1978); Associ-
ated Radio Serv. Co. v. Page Airways, Inc. 414 F. Supp. 1088, 1096 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
131 Bostick Oil Co. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 478 F. Supp. 68, 71 (D.S.C. 1979); Rosemont
Enterprises, Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 691, 695 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Petrou v.
Hale, 43 N.C. App. 650, 655, 260 S.E.2d 130, 133-34 (1979).
15 See, e.g., Blades, supra note 20, at 1423-24; Note, A Remedy for the Discharge of
Professional Employees Who Refuse to Perform Unethical or Illegal Acts: A Proposal in
Aid of Professional Ethics, 28 VAND. L. REV. 805, 828 (1975).
1S6 Professor Blades predicted that a cause of action analogous to abusive discharge
would be well suited as a means of redress for wrongful discharge: "Just as the use of legal
processes as a means of extortion gives rise to a damage remedy, so too should the oppres-
sive use of the right of discharge." Blades, supra note 20, at 1424. In practice, however, the
unscrupulous employer may exercise his power of discharge because of past conduct by the
employee, rather than as a means of influencing the employee's future activity. In Geary, for
example, the plaintiff was fired allegedly because he had exposed a potentially dangerous
product and thus prevented it from being marketed. 456 Pa. at 173-74, 319 A.2d at 175. In
dismissing the plaintiff's claim for damages, the Geary court explained:
There is nothing ... from which we could infer that the company fired Geary for
the specific purpose of ... coercing him to break any law or otherwise to compro-
mise himself. According to his own averments, Geary had already won his own
battle within the company. The most natural inference from the chain of events
recited.., is that Geary had made a nuisance of himself, and the company dis-
charged him to preserve administrative order in its own house. This hardly
amounts to an "ulterior purpose."
Id. at 180, 319 A.2d at 175 (footnotes omitted). It seems clear, therefore, that the reasoning
applied in Geary, although wholly consistent with the proof requirements of abuse of pro-
cess, would render an analogous cause of action for abusive discharge ineffective in prevent-
1980]
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A second tort theory advanced as a viable means of redress for
the aggrieved at-will employee is prima facie tort. 37 The primary
purpose of this cause of action, which has experienced its greatest
development in the New York courts,3 8 is the remedy of inten-
tional wrongs that do not fit within any of the traditionally recog-
nized tort categories.13 9 It has been defined as follows:
[I]ntentionally to do that which is calculated in the ordinary
course of events to damage, and which does, in fact, damage an-
other in that person's property or trade, is actionable if done
without just cause or excuse.140
To recover under the prima facie tort theory, however, an at-will
employee would be required to show that the employer's conduct
was malicious' and that special damages were incurred as a result
of the discharge. 42 It is suggested that the combined effect of these
proof requirements would constitute a major obstacle in the appli-
ing employer misuse of his power of dismissal.
137 See generally Brown, The Rise and Threatened Demise of the Prima Facie Tort
Principle, 54 Nw. U.L. REv. 563 (1959); Forkosch, An Analysis of the "Prima Facie Tort"
Cause of Action, 42 CORNELL L. REV. 465 (1957); Note, The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine, 52
COLUM. L. Q. 503 (1952); Note, The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine in New York-Another
Writ? 42 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 530 (1968); Note, Abstaining from Willful Injury-The Prima
Facie Tort Doctrine, 10 SYRACUSE L. REV. 53 (1958).
1'8 See Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 213, 536 P.2d 512, 513 (1975) (en banc); W. PRos-
SER, supra note 129, § 130, at 953 & n.96; Forkosch, supra note 137, at 475.
ME.g., Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 204 (1904); Knapp Engraving Co. v. Key-
stone Photo Engraving Corp., 1 App. Div. 2d 170, 172, 148 N.Y.S.2d 635, 637 (1st Dep't
1956). In New York, the doctrine has been used only where the intentional injury could not
be redressed under recognized principles. See, e.g., Ruza v. Ruza, 286 App. Div. 767, 769,
146 N.Y.S.2d 808, 810-11 (1st Dep't 1955).
140 Mogul S.S. Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co., [1889] 23 Q.B.D. 598, 613 (C.A.) (per
Bower, L.J.) (citation omitted), aff'd [1892] A.C. 25 (1891). The principle was recognized
several years later by the United States Supreme Court in Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S.
194, 204 (1904).
141 See, e.g., Ruza v. Ruza, 286 App. Div. 2d 767, 769, 146 N.Y.S.2d 808, 811 (1st Dep't
1955). Under the interpretation given the malice requirement, the defendant will be liable in
prima facie tort only where his motive for the discharge was solely to injure the plaintiff.
E.g., Benton v. Kennedy-Van Suan Mfg. & Eng'r Corp., 2 App. Div. 2d 27, 29, 152 N.Y.S.2d
955, 957-58 (1st Dep't 1956); Chin v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 96 Misc. 2d 1070, 1073, 410
N.Y.S.2d 737, 739 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1978), aff'd without opinion, 70 App. Div. 2d 791,
416 N.Y.S.2d 160 (1st Dep't 1979); see Forkosch, supra note 137, at 481. Sometimes, the
courts have had difficulty in even establishing any specific intent to harm. See, e.g., Chin v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 96 Misc. 2d 1070, 1074, 410 N.Y.S.2d 737, 740 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1978); Geary, 456 Pa. at 178, 319 A.2d at 177.
142 See, e.g., Coopers & Lybrand v. Levitt, 52 App. Div. 2d 493, 498, 384 N.Y.S.2d 804,
808 (1st Dep't 1976); Frawley Chem. Corp. v. A.P. Larson Co., 274 App. Div. 643, 644-45,, 86
N.Y.S.2d 710, 713 (1st Dep't 1949). See generally RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 904
(1979).
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cation of the prima facie tort doctrine to the at-will employment
relationship. 143
For the reasons noted, none of the above theories provide a
wrongfully discharged at-will employee with both an adequate
means of redress and a means to discourage an employer's im-
proper actions. An action for "tortious breach of contract,' 1 44 how-
ever, would appear to be particularly appropriate for fulfilling both
of these aims. The theory, based on the principle that bad faith
conduct interfering with contractual relationships may be regarded
as tortious, has been developed primarily in the area of insurance
contracts. 45 Realizing that "the relationship of the insurer and in-
sured is inherently unbalanced [and that] the adhesive nature of
insurance contracts places the insurer in a superior bargaining po-
sition," courts have implied a duty on the insurer to deal in good
faith with the insured.14 The essence of tortious breach of insur-
ance contracts is "the unreasonable conduct of the [insurance] car-
rier measured against its duty arising under the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing .... ,,17 This action has permitted
recovery, for example, by an insured where the insurer unreasona-
bly refuses to settle an insurance claim on his behalf.4 8 Signifi-
143 Another difficulty with the prima facie tort doctrine is the unwillingness of some
courts to apply it. For example, in Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975) (en
banc), although the plaintiff alleged prima facie tort, the Supreme Court of Oregon opined
that "the term serves no purpose in Oregon and we will advance the jurisprudence of this
state by eliminating it." Id. at 213, 536 P.2d at 513.
144 See generally J. McCARTHY, PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN BAD FAITH CASES (2d ed. 1978);
Kircher, Insurer's Mistaken Judgment-A New Tort? 59 MARQ. L. REv. 775 (1976); Com-
ment, An Independent Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Insurance Contracts-
Gruenverg v. Aetna Insurance Co., 11 SAN DINGo L. REv. 492 (1974); Comment, The New
Tort of Bad Faith Breach of Contract: Christian v. American Home Assurance Corp., 13
TULSA L.J. 605 (1978).
1'5 See, e.g., Escambia Treating Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 421 F. Supp. 1367 (N.D.
Fla. 1976); United Servs. Auto Ass'n v. Werley, 526 P.2d 28 (Alaska 1974); John Hancock
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. McNeill, 27 Ariz. App. 502, 556 P.2d 803 (1976); Silberg v. California
Life Ins. Co., 11 Cal. 3d 452, 521 P.2d 1103, 113 Cal. Rptr. 711 (1974); Amsden v. Grinnell
Mutual Reinsurance Co., 203 N.W.2d 252 (Iowa 1972); United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co. v. Peterson, 91 Nev. 617, 540 P.2d 1070 (1975); Chavez v. Chenoweth, 89 N.M. 423, 553
P.2d 703 (Ct. App. 1976); Christian v. American Home Assurance Co., 577 P.2d 899 (Okla.
1978).
146 Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 24 Cal. 3d 809, 820, 598 P.2d 452, 457, 157 Cal.
Rptr. 482, 487 (1979) (emphasis omitted), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3568 (March 3, 1980
No. 79-1073).
147 Blake v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 99 Cal. App. 3d 901, 919, 160 Cal. Rptr. 528, 538 (1979)
(citing Austero v. National Cas. Co., 84 Cal. App. 3d 1, 26, 148 Cal.Rptr. 653, 669 (1978))
(emphasis in original).
8 B.g., Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 66 Cal. 2d 425, 426 P.2d 173, 58 Cal. Rptr. 13 (1967).
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cantly, use of the cause of action has been allowed even though the
conduct of the insurer also constituted a breach of contract. 149
Application of the theory of tortious breach of contract to the
relationship between employer and employee is warranted for the
same reasons that exist in the insurance field. Adopting such a
cause of action would provide adequate protection for both parties.
Clearly, the employee's interest in retaining his employment would
be safeguarded. The employer's right to effectively manage the or-
ganization would also be preserved, since an aggrieved employee
must make "a clear showing of bad faith" on the part of the em-
ployer before he is able to recover. 1 0 In addition, the strict proof
requirements under tortious breach of contract,151 in conjunction
with the good faith standard previously advanced, would protect
the employer's business decisions. The elements of proof, however,
would not impede recovery for damages resulting from an em-
ployer's action that had no legal or social justification. Morevoer,
upon satisfaction of the proof requirements, a wrongfully dis-
missed at-will employee would be compensated for loss of wages
and any other resultant injury. Importantly, as in other tort alter-
natives, punitive damages would also be available under this
theory.152
CONCLUSION
The at-will doctrine, once an absolute bar to actions by dis-
charged at-will employees, has witnessed significant limitations re-
In Crisci, the first case in which the insurer's liability for bad faith was directly addressed,
the court held that an insurer owes to its insured an implied-in-law duty of good faith and
fair dealing that it will do nothing to deprive the insured of the benefits of the policy. Id. at
429, 426 P.2d at 176, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 16. The court reasoned that the duty arose because of
the tremendous disparity in the economic situation and the insured's lack of bargaining
power. Id. at 431, 426 P.2d at 177, 58 Cal. Rptr. at 17.
149 See, e.g., Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 578, 510 P.2d 1032, 1040, 108
Cal. Rptr. 480, 488 (1973).
150 E.g., Christian v. American Home Assurance Co., 577 P.2d 899, 905 (Okla. 1978).
,51 One commentator has posited the following as the elements of tortious breach of
contract:
(1) Duty; the existence of a special relationship. . . which gives rise to the respon-
sibility. . . to deal in good faith. . . . (2) Breach of that duty. . . . (3) Bad faith
or unreasonable conduct. . . . (4) Damages proximately caused by the conduct.
Comment, The New Tort of Bad Faith Breach of Contract: Christian v. American Home
Assurance Corp., 13 TULSA L.J. 605, 613 (1978).
152 See, e.g., Richardson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., 25 Cal. App. 3d 232,




cently both by statute and case law. Thus, it is now recognized
that there are reasons for discharge entitling an aggrieved em-
ployee to damages. These limitations have not required any corre-
sponding restriction of the employee's right to terminate the em-
ployment relationship, apparently in recognition of the
development that the legal underpinning of the at-will doc-
trine-mutuality of obligation-has been undermined because of
unequal bargaining power between employer and employee. Never-
theless, the state legislatures have declined to abolish the at-will
doctrine and the majority of courts that have adopted exceptions
to the traditional rule have done so only on a very limited basis. It
is hoped that the future will bring a more realistic approach to the
employment relationship by allowing an aggrieved employee to re-
cover damages when he is dismissed in bad faith. A standard of
good faith erected in place of the traditional rule will advance the
interests of most employees without impinging the substantial
rights of businessmen.
Thomas C. Rice
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